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‘Thou hasT GIVeN me a body’:
TheoloGICal aNThropoloGy aNd
The VIrTual ChurCh
Travis Pickell
“Thou hast given me a body,
Wherein the glory of thy power shineth,
Wonderfully composed above the beasts,
Within distinguished into useful parts,
Beatified without with many ornaments.
Limbs rarely poised,
And made for Heaven:
Arteries filled
With celestial spirits:
Veins, wherein blood floweth,
Refreshing all my flesh,
Like rivers.
Sinews fraught with the mystery
Of wonderful strength,
Stability,
Feeling.
For God designs thy body, for His sake,
A Temple of the Deity to make.”1
introduCtion
There is no denying the absolutely revolutionary effect of digital and
Internet technology on society in the twenty-first century. For many people,
the Internet provides an instant connection to friends, family, colleagues,
workstations, entertainment media, and other valuable (or completely trivial)
information. As a result, the world is becoming more networked, opportunities
for entrepreneurial growth are more widespread, and the speed and efficiency of

1 Thomas Traherne, “Thanksgiving for the Body,” quoted in David Brown,
God and Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007), 12.

everyday life is increasing rapidly.2 Add blistering growth in digital Smartphone
technology, which effectively turns every mobile phone into a web-connected
personal computer, and one can easily see that “connectivity” is quickly becoming
the new norm—and a key societal value.
Many churches, for which “connection” between people is also a key value,
are attempting to harness the power of these new technologies in innovative
and exciting ways. Some Christians view the Internet as an invaluable tool for
evangelism, teaching, community building and pastoral care. There are even
some who advocate the formation of standalone virtual congregations: churches
whose primary (or only) mode of meeting together is through the medium of the
Internet. And yet, despite this optimistic embrace of the virtual world by some,
the ambiguous nature of technological advancement also necessitates critical
theological reflection. As noted by a study on “virtual Christianity” sponsored
by the World Council of Churches, “being too quick to employ new technologies
may lead to the divine message being shaped or even substituted by a human
medium.”3
This essay will analyze potential opportunities and dangers presented by
the phenomenon of Virtual Churches (VCs). The main contention of this essay
is that the VC phenomenon conveys a truncated, anti-biblical anthropology,
ultimately undermining the very gospel it is trying to share. Toward that end,
§2 will outline what is meant by VC—including aspects such as the nature of
cyberspace, digital representations of the self (avatars) and worship as practiced
by some online communities today. §3 will attempt to disrupt the idea of a morally
neutral technological medium. Following Marshall McLuhan’s aphorism “The
medium is the message,”4 it will show how technological media, regardless of
apparently “sanctified” content, affect human society and psychology through
implicit assumptions about what is important, normal, or even possible. §4 will
then make the case for the importance of an embodied, Augustinian theological
anthropology. Finally §5 will show how, by virtue of the “message” conveyed
through its very “medium,” the VC movement is incompatible with such an
anthropology. This essay will conclude with a call for a more critical engagement
of the Church with the Internet—engagement because the Church is commanded
to take the gospel into all the world (Matt 28:19), “and that includes cyberspace;”5
critical because “that society never existed in East or West, ancient time or

2 C.f. Thomas L. Friedman’s incisive description of the “flattening” of the
world in the last 30 years. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of
the Twenty-first Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
3 Jean Nicolas Bazin and Jérôme Cottin, Virtual Christianity: Potential and
Challenge for the Churches (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2004), 2.
4 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 7.
5 Patrick Dixon, Cyber Church: Christianity and the Internet (Eastbourne:
Kingsway Publications Ltd., 1997), 162.
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modern, [one might add virtual or embodied] which could absorb the word of
Christ painlessly into its system.”6
what is virtual ChurCh?
There are many in the Church today who have no idea that something called
VC actually exists. And yet, the VC is a growing phenomenon, becoming ever
more mainstream daily, as evidenced by the proliferation of Internet campuses
hosted by some of the most successful churches in America.7 An Internet
campus is a website through which one can participate in chat-room discussions
and online prayer groups with other members of the community, and, perhaps
most saliently, where one can view the worship service live from one’s home.
An Internet campus is often one of a number of satellite campuses in which a
church’s worship service is broadcast to other groups meeting outside of the
main campus building, which for reasons such as geography or space limitations
cannot attend. An Internet campus, however, is not a VC, at least not as I am
using the term in this essay. One may imagine the difference in that a VC is a
church that meets corporately8 only by means of an Internet campus. Or, to put it
another way, a VC is a church that meets in cyberspace. In the early days of VC,
members of the online community would simply log into a website where they
could read sermons, access educational websites, or share prayer requests, joys,
concerns, and experiences with other members of the community. In these early
manifestations, the experience was primarily text-based, mediated through chatrooms and Internet forums.9 Eventually, however, VCs began to move toward
more visually mediated ways of interacting in cyberspace, utilizing online virtual
“worlds,” such as Second Life.10
6 Andrew Walls, “The Gospel as Prisoner and Liberator of Culture: Is There a
‘Historic Christian Faith’?” in Landmark Essays in Mission and World Christianity, ed.
Robert L. Gallagher and Paul Hertig (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2009), 139.
7 Notable examples include McLean Bible Church in Washington, DC (http://
www.mcleanbibleinternet.org/); Liquid Church in Morristown, NJ (http://live.liquidchurchonline.com/); Saddleback Church in Lake Forest, CA (http://saddleback.com/
internetcampus/live/); Life Church in Edmund, OK (http://internet.lifechurch.tv/); and
North Point Community Church in Atlanta, GA (http://northpointonline.tv/blog).
8 This is an instance in which language is stretched to its limits by encountering new phenomena. As will become clear later in this essay, one of my critiques of VC
is that its assumed theological anthropology is disembodied, and therefore in one sense
incorporate (corpus=body). By “corporately” I mean “as a group.”
9 For two enthusiastic portrayals of some of these earlier essays into virtual
community see Patrick Dixon, Cyber Church: Christianity and the Internet (Eastbourne:
Kingsway Publications Ltd., 1997), and Walter P. Wilson The Internet Church. (Nashville: Word Publishing, 2000).
10 http://secondlife.com/. Some VC communities, such as “The Church of
Fools” (http://www.churchoffools.com/) and St. Pixels Church of the Internet (http://
www.stpixels.com/), have created their own virtual worlds in which to meet, but many
communities are utilizing the widely used and already established Second Life. E.g.

In these virtual worlds one’s presence and all of her experiences are mediated
through her online persona, or avatar. According to Philip Rosedale, the creator of
Second Life, an avatar is “the representation of your chosen embodied appearance
to other people in a virtual world.”11 One might say that a person’s avatar is her
mode of “incarnation”12 in the virtual world. Through one’s avatar one may visit
new places, meet new people, have conversations, sing, paint, or even dance—all
within the virtual world. VC advocates describe the avatar-mediated experience
as an “embodied” existence in a world that is every bit as real as the one most
people inhabit on a day-to-day basis. In fact, the goal is an experience that cannot
be differentiated from a non-cyber experience. In this way “virtual” and “real”
are not, for them, antithetical terms: the more virtual something is, the more real
it is—and this is the case with virtual relationships, virtual community, and even
virtual embodiment. Some VC advocates even look forward to a “fusion” of
virtual reality with neuroscience, effectively making an avatar more than simply
a visual representation of someone, but actually an extension of that person’s self
into cyberspace—psychologically, physically, and emotionally. A decade ago, an
enthusiastic Walter Wilson wrote the following:
The future is not only about silicon. It is about biology. When the two
are combined, they begin to move together. We can now see some things
that stagger the imagination, such as a neobiological civilization of
intelligent machines…The world of the born—all that is nature—and the
world of the made—all that is humanly engineered—are becoming one
in the same. Machines are gradually becoming biological, and biology is
becoming engineered.13
All of this, however, represents only some of the most extreme aspects of
the attempt to establish VC. Most of the actual engagement with VC, or with other
Internet-related Church endeavors, is actually a great deal more commonplace—
whether it involves speaking casually with other Christian users on an Internet
game such as Second Life, posting a prayer request to an online listserv, or
LifeChurch.tv, Second Life Bible Church (http://www.dokimos.org/secondlife/), and the
1st Presbyterian Church of Second Life (http://www.1pcsl.org), to name a few.
11 Quoted in Aaron Britt, “On Language: Avatar,” New York Times, August 8,
2008, New York Edition. Italics added.
12 In classical Hindu, the term “avatar” (ava = ‘down’; ti’ = ‘cross’) is most
often translated into English as “incarnation.” C.f. Noel Sheth, “Hindu Avatara and
Christian Incarnation: A Comparison,” in Philosophy East & West 52, no. 1 (January
2002): 98. Religion and Philosophy Collections, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2010).
C.f. Mark Howe, “Online Church? First Steps Towards Virtual Incarnation,” Grove
Pastoral Series, P112 (Cambridge: Grove Books Unlimited, 2007).
13 Wilson, The Internet Church, 47-48. This commingling of the technological
and the biological was given popular expression in the movie “Avatar” (2009), which
provides a (somewhat) conceivable expression of the extrapolation of the logic of virtually embodied experience, such as those described by some proponents of VC. Technology could one day plausibly enable people to embody a virtual avatar in a digital
environment, in much the same way.
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simply interacting with friends on social media sites such Facebook, Twitter,
and MySpace. These are things that many Internet users do every single day.
Given the capability of rapid information exchange, as well as the already wellestablished trends in online social networking, why would anyone ever challenge
the assumption that the Church ought to leverage technological advancements in
the service of God’s kingdom? If people are spending more and more time on the
Internet, shouldn’t the Church go there in order to share the gospel with them?
Surely, if the Church does not utilize the Internet to spread the good news, it will
only abandon it to ever more devious forms of content. After all, like any other
technology, the Internet is a medium—and if a medium, is it not the content that
matters most?
the power of the teChnologiCal medium
This was the view of David Sarnoff, founder of the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) and president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).
After a distinguished career in telecommunications, Sarnoff received an honorary
degree from the University of Notre Dame. In his acceptance speech he said the
following: “We are too prone to make technological instruments the scapegoats
for the sins of those who wield them. The products of modern science are not in
themselves good or bad; it is the way they are used that determine their value.”14
This view of technology as inherently amoral (neither moral nor immoral) is the
predominant view today, as it has been in most periods of technological optimism.
Marshall McLuhan, a younger contemporary of Sarnoff, reached a different
conclusion. McLuhan, a brilliant—if eccentric—communications and media
theorist, witnessed the rise of mass media and discerned its philosophical and
sociological import to an almost prophetic degree. In his book, Understanding
Media: The Extensions of Man, he analyzed the history of technological
advancement, with particular attention to the effects of new technologies on those
who use them. Contrary to the view expressed by Sarnoff—that the technological
medium itself is neither good nor bad; what matters is the message the medium
carries—McLuhan asserted that, in fact, “the medium is the message.”15 The
medium of communication, according to McLuhan, actually does more to affect
us than the content. Any new technological development—eyeglasses, pocket
watches, tennis shoes, airplanes, written language, etc.—is a medium that
implicitly carries with it a set of assumptions about what is important, normal,
or even possible. These underlying forces usher in drastic changes regardless of
the content carried by the medium. According to McLuhan, these changes are
inherent within the technological medium itself—not a result of the content
actually printed on the pages of the books themselves. This is what is meant by
“The medium is the message.” “The ‘message’ of any medium or technology is
the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs.”16
14
15
16

Quoted in McLuhan, Understanding Media, 11.
Ibid., 7. Italics added.
Ibid., 8.

Not one to mince words, McLuhan referred to Sarnoff’s comments as
“the voice of the current somnambulism.”17 Further, he adds, “our conventional
response to all media, namely that it is how they are used that counts, is the numb
stance of the technological idiot.”18 Such a view of technological instrumentalism
is actually dangerous because “any medium has the power of imposing its own
assumptions on the unwary.”19 Focusing on the “content” is misguided because “it
is only too typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of
the medium.”20 For McLuhan “the ‘content’ of a medium is like the juicy piece of
meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind.”21
McLuhan, however, was no conservative reactionary. He was not simply
decrying the use of technology as inherently evil or dangerous. Rather, the
contrary is true. McLuhan supported technological growth and development;
only he recognized that new technologies, in turn, affect humanity. His aim was
to decipher and anticipate the effects of media in order to better control them.
He saw every new technology as an extension of the reach of humankind, and
he wanted to prevent the inversion of the relationship. Through uncritical use of
new technology, there is always a danger that humans become subject to their
own creation on some level; “subliminal and docile acceptance of media impact
[makes new media] prisons without walls for their human users.”22
Perhaps the most amazing thing about the analysis McLuhan proffered
in Understanding Media, is that rather than becoming outdated after almost 50
years, it is more applicable today than ever. Consider the following quotation,
written decades before the Internet became a popular medium:
Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended
our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both
space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly we approach
the final phase of the extensions of man—the technological simulation of
consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively
and corporately extended to the whole of human society, much as we
already extended our senses and our nerves by the various media.23
Those familiar with the open-source online encyclopedia Wikipedia, or
the rapid-fire social media platform Twitter, will instantly recognize parallels
with McLuhan’s vision of a collectively shared “creative process of knowing.”
McLuhan’s analysis is as relevant as ever, and it would behoove us to pay attention
to him.

17
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Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 15.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 3-4.
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In a book published earlier this year, technology writer Nicholas Carr
did just that. In The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains,24
Carr attempts to answer the question: How is today’s technology, specifically
the Internet, affecting us? What he has found is that the “process of [shared]
knowing” described by McLuhan is happening today on a wide scale. This has
had the effect of dramatically increasing access to information and knowledge on
a broad scale. But the price we are paying for width and breadth of information
is a shallowness of thought. Carr argues that our brains are “plastic,” that is, they
are molded and shaped continually as a result of how they are used (or not used).
Carr warns: “One thing is very clear: if, knowing what we know today about the
brain’s plasticity, you were to set out to invent a medium that would rewire our
mental circuits as quickly and thoroughly as possible, you would probably end
up designing something that looks and works a lot like the Internet.”25 We are
becoming a distracted people, and this is evidenced not only sociologically and
anecdotally, but also neurologically. The next section of this paper will explain
how the idea of VC conveys a theological anthropology that devalues the body.
What is important to note here, however, is that apart from the theological and
philosophical assumptions involved, prolonged uncritical engagement with the
Internet itself may actually physically harm our bodies, by molding and shaping
our neurological connections in ways that we cannot actually understand without
further research and reflection.
are we our bodies?
a Case for an embodied theologiCal anthropology
At this point it may be helpful to recall the early discussion of the VC
(§2). Those who argue for the validity of VC stress that congregations that meet
virtually in cyberspace are participating in “real community.” The relationships
that are formed are genuine, so much so that when a long-time member of the
community stops attending virtual worship meetings, the community is likely to
follow up to see if something is wrong.26 Apart from the highly problematic issue
of the sacraments,27 VC advocates argue that a virtual congregation lacks none of
the essential marks of the Church. In fact, many will point to the fact that physical
proximity was never a prerequisite for Church community, going so far as to
call Paul the first “cyberapostle”28 because he used the technology available (pen,
24 Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains, (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010).
25 Carr, The Shallows, 115.
26 C.f. Howe, “Online Church?”
27 I have chosen not to focus on sacramentology in this paper, as important as
it is, because of the wide range of views on sacramentology in the Church. Whereas an
argument against the VC on the basis of the impossibility of virtual sacraments could be
sidestepped by those with a lower view of the sacraments, the argument against a truncated theological anthropology stands for any Christians who hope to avoid the charge
of latent Gnosticism.
28 Dixon, Cyber Church, 153.

ink, written language, etc.) to communicate his presence virtually throughout the
known world. But for Paul, virtual presence was always a regretful concession,
never the ideal situation. He repeatedly professed his desire to be physically present
with those to whom he writes (Rom 15:32; 1 Cor 16:6; Gal 4:20; Phil1:26). Much
of the New Testament suggests that there is something about “meeting together”
(Heb 10:25) physically that is essential to human community.
One’s views about the essentials of community reflect deeper assumptions
about what it means to be human. Theological anthropology, the study of what
it means to be human in relation to the divine, ought to be an important aspect
of any reflection on ecclesiology because it influences how one conceptualizes
fundamental Christian doctrines, such as sin, salvation, sanctification, eschatology
and ethics.
In a recent book, James K.A. Smith elaborates three theological
anthropologies that are dominant in the Church today. The first, and probably
the most prevalent, is the rationalist picture of humanity—“as old as Plato but
rebirthed by Descartes and cultivated throughout modernity, [this model] sees
the human person as fundamentally a thinking thing.”29 The resulting theological
anthropology is characterized by a view of humanity as “essentially immaterial
mind or consciousness—occasionally and temporarily embodied, but not
essentially.”30 Smith argues that this rationalistic anthropology was “absorbed
particularly by Protestant Christianity (whether liberal or conservative), which
tends to operate with an overly cognitivist picture of the human person and thus
tends to foster an overly intellectualist account of what it means to be or become a
Christian.” When the Church functions under this anthropological model salvation
occurs through the dissemination of religious knowledge and stress is laid upon
orthodoxy (right doctrine), often to the exclusion of orthopraxis (right action) and
the formation of patterns of intentionality (right loves).
This rationalist anthropology is not without its critics. Some, especially
within the Reformed tradition,31 have charged this viewpoint with reductionism
and an insufficient account of human knowing. “Before we are thinkers,” they
say, “we are believers.”32 One’s thinking, more often than one may realize, has
its proper basis in faith. At some level there is a prior element of trust in some
“authority,” be it one’s parents, teachers, or textbook writers. According to this

29 James K.A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural
Formation, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 41.
30 Ibid., 42.
31 C.f. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason
Within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984);
Christian Smith, Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
32 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 43.
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theological anthropology, human beings are “essentially religious.”33 This view
attempts to move a person’s center of gravity, so to speak, from her head to her
heart. But as Smith points out, it is unclear whether the “person-as-believer”
model goes far enough in this direction. Smith continues,
While in the person-as-believer model, the human person is not a “brain
in a vat,” she still seems like an isolated, disembodied island of beliefs.
In this model, the “believer” feels like a chastened rationalist . . . to put
it otherwise, if I bump into a “thinking thing” and a “believing thing” on
the street, I don’t think I’d notice much difference.34
The problem with both of these theological anthropologies is that they
are truncated. They “reduce us and our core identities to something less than
they should be.”35 “As a result, significant parts of who we are—in particular,
our noncognitive ways of being-in-the-world that are more closely tethered
to our embodiment or animality—tend to drop off the radar or are treated as
nonessential.”36 In short, the person-as-thinker and person-as-believer models
are “insufficiently Augustinian.”37 They do not properly take into account the
complex relationship between human desires, intentions, habits, and loves—
aspects of humanity about which Augustine wrote prolifically.
For Augustine, the most fundamental way that one relates to the world is
through love. “To be human is to love, and it is what we love that defines who
we are. Our (ultimate) love is constitutive of our identity.”38 The problem (after
the fall) is not that we do not love, but that our loves have become disordered.39
Whereas the only proper object of one’s ultimate love is God, humans tend to love
lesser goods—above all themselves.40 Psychologically, our loving intentionality
“takes the structure of desire or longing.”41 “The whole life of the good Christian
is a holy longing. . . . This is our life: to be trained by longing, and our training
through the holy longing advances in the measure that our longings are severed
from the love of this world”42 and turned towards God.
One might ask, how does our love get aimed in different directions? For
Augustine, this takes place through our habits or dispositions. According to Smith,
33 Ibid., 43.
34 Ibid., 45.
35 Ibid., 46.
36 Ibid., 46.
37 Ibid., 46.
38 Ibid., 51.
39 St. Augustine “Sermon 335C: On the feast of a martyr,” in Augustine: Political Writings, ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 59.
40 C.f. Augustine, De civitate Dei 15.22, 19.24-26; De doctrina Christiana
1.27.28; Confessiones 1.1.1, 10.6.9; Sermon 335c.5.
41 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 50.
42 Augustine, Homilies on 1 John, 4.6 as quoted in Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 50.

our dispositions are “the fulcrum of our desire: they are the hinge that ‘turns’ our
heart, our love, such that it is predisposed to be aimed in certain directions.”43 Our
dispositions, however—and this is the key point—are not primarily influenced by
our rationality or our system of beliefs. Rather, “the senses are [the] portals to the
heart, and thus the body is a channel to our core dispositions and identity.”44 This
is why embodiment must be absolutely central to any theological anthropology.
From the earliest age, human beings experience the world as a constant influx
of sensory experiences, some causing delight and others causing pain. As one
comes to understand what experiences cause delight, she responds in kind, and
habits—or dispositions—take root in her heart. “It’s as if our appendages function
as a conduit to our adaptive unconscious—sort of attitudinal reflexes—that make
us tend to act in certain ways toward certain ends.”45 That is to say, “our primary
orientation to the world is visceral, not cerebral.”46
What Augustine understood was “that the Christian doctrines of creation,
the incarnation of Christ, and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body all imply
that the body has a high metaphysical status and is an integral and permanent part
of human being.”47 Our bodies, souls, minds, and emotions are all tightly wound
together because they are all equally part of who we are. This more embodied
Augustinian theological anthropology better reflects both human experience and
the Biblical witness. While it is true that some major religious and philosophical
schools of thought have encouraged a view of humanity that separates body from
soul, effectively bifurcating the human person, the truth remains that humans are,
in fact, integrated beings.
Today, there is a renewed interest in the essential importance of embodiment
for theology. Feminist theologian Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel argues for a
theology of embodiment. “In a variety of situations,” says Moltmann-Wendel,
“we can distance ourselves from our bodies, but at some point they get hold of
us and will not let go.”48 In the Scriptures, she points out, if one “start[s] from
the creation, not from the ‘fall’,”49 one will find that God created a good world
characterized by a celebration of embodiment. In the New Testament, if one
looks at the life of Jesus one notices some intriguing phenomena: the centrality
of physical healings to Jesus’ ministry,50 the way in which Jesus’ teachings
address the entire human situation (physically and spiritually),51 and the way in
which Jesus enjoyed sharing meals with those around him.52 But above all, the
43 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 50. Italics original.
44 Ibid., 50. Italics added.
45 Ibid., 59.
46 Ibid., 60.
47 Miles, Rereading Historical Theology, 100.
48 Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, I Am My Body (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), 21-22.
49 Ibid., 36.
50 Ibid., 36.
51 Ibid., 37.
52 Ibid., 49.
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doctrines of incarnation and resurrection emphasize the importance of the body
to any theological anthropology: “a theological return to embodiment recalls the
distinctive feature of Christianity, that God became body and in so doing has
confirmed and healed all our bodily nature.”53
what virtual ChurCh Conveys about theologiCal anthropology
Of the three anthropological viewpoints just described, only the first two are
compatible with the idea of VC. If what essentially makes us human is our ability
to think and reason, then there is no reason why our presence cannot be mediated
through a digital representation of the self (avatar). Humans can legitimately
communicate with one another in this way. They may have enriching conversations
with one another, and perhaps, even work out important intellectual and social
problems. No doubt, valuable educational opportunities will arise as humanity
learns to take advantage of cyberspace as a virtual meeting place, as is already
happening with online distance-learning courses offered at colleges around the
country. In a similar way, VC is completely consonant with the person-as-believer
model. One must assume that many of those who are already inhabiting virtual
worlds like Second Life do not yet believe the gospel of Jesus Christ. What better
way to reach them than to start a digital church-plant right in the middle of their
virtual neighborhood? If what is most important about us as humans is simply that
we believe, then there is no excuse for the Church not to do so.
What makes the VC phenomenon such a difficult ethical problem to
unravel is the fact that there is some truth in each of these viewpoints. That we
are rational beings is certainly a central part of our mandate to be stewards of
creation (Genesis 1:27-30). And who would deny the importance of belief in
the Christian life (John 6:29)? If, however, the medium is the message, then our
ecclesiology conveys something about the gospel itself—whether we mean for it
to do so or not. If a VC is a legitimate congregation of human beings mediated
through virtual representations of the self (avatars), this suggests that what is most
important about the self does not include the body. Doubtless some of those who
are involved with VC would deny this as a misrepresentation of their views. But
this misses the point. If McLuhan and Carr are correct, a VC will convey this
“message” implicitly, rather than explicitly. In fact, no claim is being made about
the explicit viewpoints of those utilizing this technology except the following:
their anthropological views are incompatible with their mode of ecclesiology if
they subscribe to the third type of theological anthropology outlined above. While
humans may certainly be more than their bodies, they are also certainly no less
than embodied creatures.
Some people see the VC as a new way of “embodying” the church in a digital
age. This use of embodiment language, however, is artificial; what it conveys is
only the semblance of embodiment, while leaving the actual body behind. While it
is certainly true that when people participate in computer-mediated virtual worlds
they experience somatic effects, this is only an accidental by-product of the fact
53

Ibid., 103.

that they are in-fact using their bodies in the process of fleeing from their bodies.
Any language of virtual embodiment, then, relies heavily on borrowing from
actual embodiment in the process of denying its importance. Virtual embodiment
is, in this sense, only derivative of actual embodiment, and is, in fact, ultimately a
perversion of it.
As with any new technology, these dangers are implicit and subtle, and
therefore, all the more pernicious. This is certainly the case with reference to the
ambiguous relationship between technology and embodiment—between the body
and the machine. As Wendell Berry once wrote,
The danger most immediately to be feared in “technological progress” is
the degradation and obsolescence of the body . . . since the beginning of
the technological revolution, more and more people have looked upon the
body, along with the rest of the natural creation, as intolerably imperfect
by mechanical standards. They see the body as an encumbrance of the
mind—the mind, that is, as reduced to a set of mechanical ideas that
can be implemented in machines—and so they hate it and long to be
free of it. The body has limits that the machine does not have; therefore,
remove the body from the machine so that the machine can continue as
an unlimited idea.54
If the body is not to fall into obsolescence in the face of technological
advancement, as Berry feared, then how should the Church envision its engagement
with the virtual world? Clearly, there must be some level of engagement. There
are people who spend a great majority of their lives on the Internet, many of them
participating in virtual worlds such as Second Life. They are not beyond the reach
of the love of God, and therefore the Church must seek to reach them with the
gospel. The virtual world is a mission field. Missiologist Andrew Walls offers a
distinction that might be helpful here. He distinguishes between two opposing
tendencies, “each of [which] has its origin in the gospel itself.”55 The “indigenizing
principle”56 gives voice to the fact that the gospel can “make itself at home” in
any cultural context (including the idiosyncratic cultural context of Second Life).
But “along with the indigenizing principle… the Christian inherits the pilgrim
principle, which whispers to him that he has no abiding city and warns him that to
be faithful to Christ will put him out of step with his society.”57 In its engagement
with the virtual world, the Church must hold onto a sense of provisionality. In
advocating for standalone virtual congregations, VC enthusiasts unwittingly (and
sometimes wittingly) send a message that relativizes the human body. The Church
should engage the virtual world in the name of the gospel, but “making a place
54 Wendell Berry, “Feminism, the Body, and the Machine,” in What are People
For? Essays by Wendell Berry (New York: North Point Press, 1990), 190-191. Once
again, the film “Avatar,” gives popular expression to the latent escapism implied in the
ideal of virtual embodiment.
55 Walls, “The Gospel as Prisoner and Liberator of Culture,” 137.
56 Ibid., 137.
57 Ibid., 139.
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for Christianity in the virtual world does not mean that Christianity should itself
become virtual or disembodied.”58 Let us not forget the words of Traherne, “Thou
hast given me a body.”
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